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ISSN 0341 - 0787.I. The Failure of Economic Adjustment Programs
The principal objectives of economic adjustment programs, fre-
quently supported by the International Monetary Fund, are to
restore a viable balance-of-payments situation, to contain infla-
tion, to remove distortions in relative prices, and thereby to
enhance the overall growth prospects of Third World economies.
However, recent reviews on the macroeconomic effects of IMF
adjustment programs point to an only limited success in these
respects. Khan [1988] summarizes the experiences of 67 developing
countries with IMF programs during 1973-1986 as follows: "In the
short run programs have led to an improvement in the current
account, the balance of payments, and inflation, but this was
accompanied by a decline in the growth rate. In the longer run
the positive effects of programs on the external balance and
inflation are strengthened, and the adverse growth effects re-
duced" (p. I). The notion of growth-oriented adjustment appears
to be an euphemism if the program costs in terms of low growth
rates are basically "in line with the predictions of the theoret-
ical models that underlie the design of Fund programs" (ibid, p.
26; for the model applied, see IMF [1987].
It is thus not surprising that IMF adjustment programs have been
increasingly attacked for doing little in improving the economic
malaise of many developing countries, or even worsening their
situation [e.g. Killick, 1984; Taylor, 1981]. However, it remains
open to question which of the principal elements of IMF programs
- domestic credit restraint, public deficit reduction, and de-
valuation - is to be blamed for the failure of growth-oriented
adjustment. Most notably, it has to be clarified whether not only
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies are growth-reducing in
the short run, but that devaluation is contractionary as well.
Besides monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies, IMF pro-
grams frequently call for producer price increases, trade
liberalization, and the removal of distortions in factor mar-
kets. The latter measures are not considered in the following
since their economic rationale and growth-enhancing effects in
the longer run are hardly to be disputed.Actually, exchange-rate policies are most controversially dis-
cussed in the literature. Since the publication of the influen-
tial paper by Krugman and Taylor [1978], the traditionally domi-
nant view has been increasingly challenged, i.e., that the
substitution effects engendered by a real devaluation are suf-
ficiently strong to assure an expansionary net effect on output
and employment.
The ongoing debate is based on a bewildering array of theoretical
frameworks [for a recent overview, see Lizondo, Montiel, 1988].
Interestingly enough, the theoretical debate has induced only few
empirical studies on the growth effects of real devaluation in
developing countries [for a notable exception, see Edwards,
1985a]. Empirical research is all the more so required as many
models leading to "'queer cases' from the view point of traditi-
onal theory" are characterized by "odd assumptions about ' sub-
stitutability' in production or consumption" [Lai, 1989, p.
291]. This paper is intended to narrow the gap in empirical
analysis. The remainder is organized as follows. Section II sum-
marizes the current debate on the role of exchange-rate policies
in economic adjustment. Section III provides the framework for
testing the economic-growth effects of real devaluation, and
presents empirical results for the 1982-1987 period. Some policy
conclusions are drawn in Section IV.
Cline [1983] provides a compendium of strange assumptions and
the evidence against them. Especially in Keynesian models rela-
tive prices play little role due to the typical assumption of
little if any substitution in production and consumption. By
contrast, changes in real exchange rates are ruled out in some
monetarist models that take the law of one price as given and
assume perfect substitution between tradables and non-
tradables.II. The Role of Exchange-Rate Policies
1. The Current Theoretical Debate
Economic adjustment programs for developing countries generally
focus on reducing domestic absorption through restrictive mone-
tary and fiscal policies,"as well as on expenditure switching
(i.e., increased production of tradables) through a devaluation
of the domestic currency. According to traditional theory, a
nominal devaluation results in higher output if there is unuti-
lized capacity and the law of one price does not hold. Both con-
ditions are typically met in a developing country context:
- The degree of capacity utilization is frequently below 50 per
cent in Third World economies [Bautista et al., 1981]. Hence,
it is highly unlikely that nominal devaluation is translated
into an equiproportional increase in prices so that the real
exchange rate does not change.
- The hypothesis "that arbitrage quickly equates goods prices
internationally has probably been rejected more decisively by
empirical evidence than any other hypothesis in the history of
economics" [Williamson, 1983, p. 201]. In fact, persistent
deviations of the index of international competitiveness from
unity are to be observed in developing countries [Balassa,
1987; Edwards, Ng, 1985]. So, devaluation leads to an increase
in relative prices between tradables and non-tradables and
thereby encourages expenditure switching.
However, the traditional view that devaluation-induced expendi-
ture switching provides an important stimulus to economic growth
has come under serious attack. Various theoretical arguments are
2 advanced that point to contractionary effects of devaluations.
Earlier studies mainly refer to adverse demand effects. The re-
This index is calculated by adjusting the nominal exchange-rate
index for changes in the price of tradables in foreign coun-
tries vis-a-vis the domestic economy.
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The following summary draws partly on Lizondo, Montiel [1988]
and Edwards [1985a].distribution of income in favour of profits and at the expense of
wages, supposed to follow a devaluation, may depress economic
activity because of the higher marginal propensity to consume of
wage earners [Diaz Alejandro, 1963; Krugman, Taylor, 1978]. Ag-
gregate demand and output may also be reduced because of a nega-
tive real balance effect (Pigou effect), since devaluation is
likely to result in a higher domestic price level [e.g. Guitian,
1976; Gylfason, Schmid, 1983; Hanson, 1983; Islam, 1984; Buffie,
1986a]. Assuming low price elasticities of imports and exports,
devaluation may also worsen the trade balance in domestic curren-
cy, thereby generating a recessionary effect on aggregate output
[Krugman, Taylor, 197 8].
Moreover, aggregate demand is expected to decline if devaluation
results in higher domestic interest rates [Lizondo, Montiel,
1988, pp. 24ff.]. The effects of an anticipated future devalu-
ation are shown to be clearly interest-rate increasing. Con-
tractionary effects of an unanticipated current devaluation are
likely unless domestic loans and foreign assets are regarded as
perfect substitutes by households: Unanticipated, devaluation is
expected to raise real working-capital requirements by inducing
increases in nominal wages and the domestic-currency price of
tradables; hence, the real excess demand for loans and domestic
interest rates will rise.
Recently, Reisen [1988] has stressed the negative fiscal implica-
tions of devaluation in the presence of a large public foreign
2
currency debt. Rising fiscal imbalances may require (additional)
expenditure cutting, induce higher inflation, thereby adding to
The expected inflation component of interest rates is treated
as exogenous. So, the focus is on the effects of devaluation on
the nominal interest rate in the following.
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By contrast, Gylfason, Risager [1984], van Wijnbergen [1986],
. and Edwards [1986] treat external debt as private sector obli-
gations. A real devaluation then increases the real value of
private interest obligations and affects private wealth (of
which external debt is a negative component) negatively. Both
effects reduce private demand for domestic output.the Pigou effect, or lead to (further) crowding out of private
investors in domestic financial markets.
Various supply-side effects are discussed that may add to the
contractionary effects of devaluation. An upward shift in the
supply curve for domestically produced goods is expected from
higher prices of factors of production, especially from an in-
crease in nominal wages, higher costs for imported inputs, and
higher working-capital costs. In many models, devaluation-induced
wage increases result from indexation, i.e., nominal wages are
assumed to be proportional to some current price index [e.g.
Branson, 1986; Edwards, 1986; van Wijnbergen, 1986]. Moreover,
devaluation causes the price of imported inputs to increase by
the same percentage as the exchange rate. The magnitude of the
increase in production costs depends on the extent to which other
factor costs respond to the devaluation and on the degree of
substitution between different factors of production. Contractio-
nary effects on domestic supply may also result from a devalu-
ation-induced increase in financing costs for labour and imported
inputs [Taylor, 1981; van Wijnbergen, 1983]. Higher costs of
working capital are mainly attributed to the rise in loan-
interest rates that may follow a devaluation.
Notwithstanding the multitude of theoretical arguments that point
to contractionary effects of a devaluation, the impact of a de-
valuation on real output remains ambiguous on analytical grounds.
This is because most of the models referred to above are based on
fairly restrictive assumptions and frequently ignore counter-
vailing effects. The following shortcomings figure prominently
[for a detailed analysis, see Lizondo, Montiel, 1988]:
- Substitution effects in domestic consumption due to the in-
crease in relative prices between tradables and non-tradables
are sometimes simply excluded, e.g. by assuming that consumers
demand only non-tradables [Krugman, Taylor, 1978].
- Similarly, real income and demand effects of devaluation
through price increases for imported inputs are no longerstrictly negative if substitution in production between labour
and imported inputs is allowed for (substitution in production
is ignored e.g. in Krugman, Taylor [1978]).
- The discussion on income-distribution effects is largely con-
fined to the distribution between labour and capital. The im-
pact on aggregate demand becomes ambiguous once the redistribu-
tion from the factors of production engaged in purely domestic
industries to those engaged in export and import-competing
industries is recognized [e.g. Cooper, 1971]. In a Heckscher-
Ohlin context, a real devaluation raises the income share of
the factors used intensively in the production of tradables and
is at the expense of other factors. The overall demand effects
are difficult to predict.
- The Tanzi effect [Tanzi, 1977] is only rarely considered in the
debate on contractionary devaluations. Due to lags in tax col-
lection or in adjusting the nominal value of specific taxes,
the real tax burden may be reduced by devaluation-induced price
increases. This effect may cause an expansionary impact of
devaluation on aggregate demand in the short run.
- The demand-reducing Pigou effect may be outweighed by wealth-
increasing effects of a devaluation, e.g. if the private sector
holds foreign currency denominated assets (whose nominal value
in domestic currency increases after a devaluation).
- Most models on contractionary devaluations apply a framework
without capital accumulation [e.g. Krugman, Taylor, 1978].
Other authors expect that investments that require imports of
capital goods are discouraged by real devaluation [Branson,
1986; Buffie, 1986b]. However, Lizondo and Montiel [1988, pp.
21ff.] show that real depreciation lowers the real supply price
of capital measured in terms of output in the traded goods
Edwards [1987] presents empirical evidence for 31 devaluation
episodes: Income distribution did not change significantly in
15 cases; in 9 (7) cases the share of labour in GDP declined
(increased).sector. Investment is then stimulated in this sector.
- Lizondo and Montiel [1988] also show that the impact of devalu-
ation on nominal wages, and thereby on the supply of domesti-
cally produced goods, can only be assessed adequately if labour
markets are modelled explicitly. In the absence of perfect wage
indexation, the nominal wage must not increase necessarily
after a devaluation.
All in all, the theoretical debate on the economic-growth effects
of devaluation is still unsettled. What is evident from the above
presentation, however, is that the arguments pointing to con-
tractionary effects of devaluation are frequently derived from
rather strange assumptions. Therefore, empirical research is
urgently required.
2. The Poor State of Empirical Research
In spite of the lively theoretical discussion on the growth
effects of devaluation, the empirical evidence is still extremely
sketchy. Moreover, most of the empirical investigations suffer
from serious shortcomings. Many studies address the topic simply
by portraying the economic-growth performance of developing coun-
tries after devaluations took place. Cooper [1971] considers 24
devaluation episodes during 1953-1966. The analysis of the devel-
opment of major components of aggregate demand leads him to con-
clude that initially devaluation tended to depress economic ac-
tivity. By contrast, Krueger [1978] finds that devaluations were
associated with improved growth performance in most cases. The
evidence presented by Edwards [1985b] is mixed: Real growth of
GDP declined in 10 out of 30 cases in the period immediately
An ambiguous effect on total investment also results from the
change in product wages once nominal wages are flexible to some
extent. Product wages decrease (increase) in the traded (non-
traded) goods sector after a devaluation. Hence, investment is
stimulated (discouraged) in the former (latter) sector. The
likelihood that total investment increases is higher if capital
is sector specific; in this case higher investment demand in
the traded goods sector can only be met out of new production.following the devaluation. Mixed results are also achieved by
studies that investigate the growth performance of developing
countries after devaluations were undertaken in the context of
IMF adjustment programs [for an overview on the extensive litera-
ture, see Khan, 1988]. The growth impact of IMF programs that
typically involve a devaluation remains ambiguous, with the
studies indicating an improvement or no significant change in
economic growth being balanced by those showing a deterioration
in the short run.
The "before-and-after" approach applied in the above studies is
subject to serious drawbacks so that the devaluation-induced
growth effects cannot be assessed adequately. Most importantly,
other factors that influence the growth performance are not con-
trolled for. A decline in GDP growth may be due to external fac-
tors, e.g. worldwide recession or deteriorating terms of trade,
rather than to devaluation. The evaluation of IMF programs does
not yield unbiased results whenever non-program determinants of
growth change between the pre-program period and the post-program
period [Khan, 1988, p. 5]. Frequently, not the effects of de-
valuation per se are assessed, but rather the combined effects of
adjustment packages which also include restrictive macroeconomic
policies [Balassa, 1987, pp. 209ff.]. Moreover, lower growth
rates in the period when a devaluation takes place need not be
the result of devaluation, but may indicate that devaluations are
undertaken when output is below the trend.
Other studies try to avoid these shortcomings by constructing
simulation models. A decline in output following a devaluation is
obtained by Gylfason and Risager [1984] for five out of eight
developing countries, and by Gylfason and Radetzki [1985] for ten
out of twelve least developed economies. Different results are
reported from country-specific simulation exercises. Branson
[1986] concludes that devaluation had a significantly negative
This selectivity bias may also lead to a spurious positive
correlation between devaluation and higher economic growth in
the subsequent periods provided that growth would have re-
covered anyway [Connolly, 1983].impact on economic growth in Kenya. By contrast, Taylor and
Rosenzweig [1984] find devaluations to be growth-enhancing in
Thailand. Generally, the outcome of the simulation models criti-
cally depends on the imputed parameter values. For example, a
built-in bias towards contractionary devaluation may be simply
due to "inadequate allowance for increases in exports and de-
creases in imports following a devaluation" [Balassa, 1987, p.
210], e.g. by assuming very low price elasticities for exports
and low elasticities of substitution between labour and imported
inputs.
Principally, it appears to be more promising to subject a re-
duced form equation on the growth impact of devaluation to re-
gression analysis. Only few studies have followed this avenue, of
which Edwards [1985a; 1989a] and Khan [1988] stand out. By defi-
nition this approach does not allow to establish whether there
are different, i.e., contractionary and expansionary, effects of
devaluation working through various channels; the coefficient of
the exchange-rate variable only captures the net growth impact of
devaluation. But this approach does not require arbitrary assump-
tions on crucially important parameter values. Moreover, it is
easily possible to control for the growth impact of external
factors, such as changes in the terms of trade, and of internal
policy measures other than currency realignments.
In their pooled time-series cross-country analyses for 1965-1980
(Edwards) and 1973-1986 (Khan) both authors account for policy
variables other than exchange-rate policies as well as for ex-
2
ternal terms-of-trade shocks. Different results are achieved for
the exchange-rate variable. It turns out to be completely in-
significant for the fairly large sample analysed by Khan, con-
Recently, Edwards has extended the period to 1965-1984
[Edwards, 1989a, pp. 324ff.]. In the following, we refer to the
earlier results if not otherwise indicated.
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Strictly speaking, the real exchange rate is not a policy vari-
able. As argued above, however, nominal devaluations of de-
veloping countries are likely to result in real devaluations in
the short run.10
sisting of 67 developing countries that had upper credit tranche
arrangements with the IMF. By contrast, the coefficient of the
contemporaneous real exchange rate is significantly negative in
Edwards' analysis of twelve developing economies, while the co-
efficient of the once lagged real exchange-rate term is signifi-
cantly positive. The author concludes [1985a, p. 12]: "These
results provide statistical support to the view that in the short
run devaluations have a contractionary effect on aggregate out-
put Also, these findings indicate that this short-term
contractionary effect is later reversed, with after one year the
devaluation having an expansionary influence on output. Moreover,
according to these results the contemporaneous and lagged effects
of the (real) devaluation cancel themselves".
Notwithstanding the considerable progress in terms of adequate
methodology, the analyses by Edwards and Khan may be challenged
on several grounds. First, problems of multicollinearity are not
discussed in either of the two studies, although they may lead to
seriously biased coefficient values. In Khan's analysis, the
specific elements of IMF adjustment programs and the program
dummy enter the regressions simultaneously. Consequently, the
Among the policy variables considered {change in domestic
credit, the exchange rate, and the ratio of the fiscal balance
to GDP), only the latter proves to be significant in the growth
equation. A program-dummy variable, which is set as "1" when an
IMF program was in effect, turns out to be significantly nega-
tive .
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In contrast to our approach to be presented in Section III.l,
an increase in the exchange-rate term represents a real devalu-
ation in the definition of Edwards. As concerns the other poli-
cy variables, Edwards finds unanticipated money growth to be
positively related with the level of real activity; the co-
efficient of the ratio of government expenditure to nominal
income turns out to be significantly positive as well.
For the extended period of 1965-1984, the coefficients of the
lagged exchange-rate variable remain insignificant, suggesting
that the short-run negative effect of devaluation on real GDP
is not reverted as time passes [Edwards, 1989a, pp. 327ff.].
This discrepancy between the recent and earlier results is
explained by referring to the adverse effects of devaluation on
the domestic currency value of huge foreign debts that had been
accumulated until the mid-1980s.11
dummy variable may capture the devaluation impact and thus render
the coefficient of the exchange-rate variable insignificant.
Edwards' results may be distorted due to the simultaneous in-
clusion of current and lagged values for the same variables
(money surprises, terms of trade, and exchange rates) which may
be highly correlated. A high partial correlation is also likely
between the terms-of-trade variable and the exchange-rate vari-
able which is defined as the relative price of tradables to non-
tradables.
Second, the negative correlation between changes in the exchange
rate and real output in the year of the devaluation may result
from a selectivity bias if devaluations are undertaken in periods
of low growth. The distortions which may arise from the selectiv-
ity bias are reduced in Khan's analysis by introducing a lagged
growth variable on the right-hand side of the equation.
Third, the growth effects of devaluation can be expected to
differ between various groups of developing countries. The large
sample of 67 countries considered by Khan consists of an
extremely heterogeneous set of developing economies, e.g. in
terms of income level, development strategies, and production and
export structures. Such structural divergencies cannot be ade-
quately controlled for by introducing country-specific (shift)
dummies which only allow for inter-country differences in the
dependent growth variable. A different growth impact of devalu-
ation between various country groups, e.g. agricultural exporters
and exporters of manufactures, may cancel out and result in the
insignificant coefficient of the exchange-rate variable. By con-
trast, the results presented by Edwards are likely to be biased,
since the group of twelve countries mainly consists of fairly
In both papers, the ratio of export prices to import prices is
supposed to capture the growth effects of external factors that
are outside the control of the devaluating country. However,
the relevance of changes in the terms of trade crucially de-
pends on the degree of openness of the country in question.
Hence, external shocks should be quantified in terms of their
balance-of-payments impact (see Section III.l).12
advanced economies with a diversified manufactured export struc-
ture. Low-income exporters of raw materials are underrepresen-
ted. The same applies to heavily indebted Latin American coun-
tries. So, the results cannot be generalized.
Fourth, the findings for the 1960s and 1970s can not necessarily
be transferred to the 1980s. Exchange-rate policies may have
become much more important for highly indebted developing coun-
tries to which external finance is no longer available. The re-
versal of international capital flows between developed and de-
veloping economies since 1982 has generated a built-in tendency
towards devaluation of the latter countries' currencies. More-
over, the Bretton Woods system was still in operation during much
of the period considered by Edwards. The majority of countries
had pegged their currencies to the US dollar, and exchange-rate
fluctuations were relatively moderate. Higher fluctuations in
2
exchange-rate indices in the post-Bretton Woods era may signifi-
cantly affect the growth impact of devaluation. Theoretically it
is well established that high uncertainty about real exchange-
rate developments has negative effects on economic performance
[Willett, 1986], There is also some empirical evidence on a nega-
tive relation between real exchange-rate instability and economic
growth [Edwards, 1989b, pp. 39ff.]. Hence, contractionary growth
effects indicated by the coefficient of the exchange-rate vari-
able may be attributed to higher exchange-rate fluctuations
rather than devaluation per se.
All in all, the above discussion highlights the need to improve
the current state of empirical research on the growth impact of
devaluation. In the following, we basically apply the analytical
framework suggested by Edwards [1985a] and Khan [1988]. The con-
ceptual improvements presented in the subsequent section are
The countries included are: India, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Greece, Israel, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador,
South Africa, and Yugoslavia,
o
In a recent paper, Edwards [1989b] shows that in 29 out of 33
developing countries the real effective exchange rate was sig-
nificantly more volatile during 1972-1985 than before.Bibliofhek
des Institute fur Weitwirtschaft
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intended to overcome the still prevailing shortcomings of previ-
ous analyses, which may lead to seriously biased results. Most
notably, it is hypothesized that the direction, the degree and
the lag structure of the growth impact of devaluation are not the
same for different developing country groups. They are supposed
to depend on various structural characteristics of Third World
economies, e.g. their development strategies, production and ex-
port structures, their foreign debt status, the level and devel-
opment of per-capita income, and the degree of exchange-rate
fluctuations.
Ill. The Impact of Real Exchange Rates on Economic Growth
1. The Test Format
The basic equation to be estimated below is of the form:
(1) Y = a + bR + cEGDP + dUOG + eTOT + fDY
The dependent variable Y represents annual real growth of GDP per
capita, as published in UNCTAD [1988] . R denotes annual changes
in the real effective exchange rate. The calculation is based on
IMF data on nominal exchange rates (partner countries' currencies
per unit of domestic currencies of sample countries) and consumer
prices [IMF, b] . A negative R denotes a real devaluation. So, a
positive sign of the coefficient b is to be expected if devalu-
ation is contractionary.
The remaining variables are introduced to control for other eco-
nomic policy measures (EGDP, UOG), the growth impact of external
shocks (TOT), and pre-devaluation differences in economic growth
(DY). The definition of these variables is as follows: EGDP re-
presents the percentage share of government expenditure in GDP,
as given in IMF [b]. If restrictive fiscal policies affect eco-
Trade weights refer to the shares in world trade and are cal-
culated from IMF [a; b]; for the formula applied and its eco-
nomic justification, see Fischer, Spinanger [1986, pp. 83ff.].14
nomic growth negatively in the short run, the coefficient c
should be negative. UOG indicates monetary surprise shocks. The
unanticipated annual change in money supply is calculated in two
steps [data from IMF, b]: (1) The expected development of money
supply is derived by assuming adaptive monetary expectations;
using quarterly data for the 1977-1987 period, the regression run
for each sample country relates current monetary growth of broad
money (M2) to the once, twice and thrice lagged values of this
variable. (2) The unanticipated change in money supply is then
given by the difference between the actual and the predicted
2
growth of monetary aggregates. If unanticipated money expansion
results in short-term positive growth effects, the coefficient d
should have a positive sign.
In addition to the growth impact of policy adjustments, we
account for the growth effects of factors that are beyond the
control of the sample countries. TOT indicates terms-of-trade
shocks. The balance-of-payments impact in period t of changes in
Alternatively, the fiscal balance relative to GDP (DGDP) is
considered as an indicator of the stance of fiscal policies in
the sample countries. These results are not reported here in
detail. The coefficient values of the other variables are hard-
ly affected by this modification. Moreover, replacing EGDP by
DGDP gives rise to some multicollinearity problems.
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In additional calculations, the fiscal balance relative to once
lagged base money is included as explaining variable in the
regressions on the expected development of monetary aggregates.
However, we concentrate on UOG in the following. The modifica-
tion does not change significantly the results presented in the
subsequent section. But the number of observations is consider-
ably reduced because of lacking data for many sample countries
if the fiscal-balance term is included.
Alternatively, we calculate the sum of terms-of-trade shocks
and interest-rate shocks (IR). The balance-of-payments impact
of the latter is given by:
IR = [(i -i ,)D. ,] / (X.+M ), where i denotes the average
interest rate on external debt (proxied by the percentage share
of interest payments in debt disbursed and outstanding in t-1),
and D denotes external debt outstanding and disbursed. Again
the results are hardly affected by this modification so that
the results are not reported due to space considerations.15
the terms of trade is given by the following formula:
(2) TOT = [(p
M-p
M ) MV ] - C(p
X-p
X ) XV ] / (X +M ),
t L t t-1 t t t-1 t J • t t
where p and p denote import and export prices respectively
(proxied by unit value indices as published in UNCTAD [1988]); MV
and XV represent imports and exports in constant prices; and M
and X are imports and exports in current prices [IMF, b]. Adverse
terms-of-trade shocks are indicated by positive values of TOT.
Hence, the coefficient e in equation (1) should be negative if
adverse external shocks are growth-reducing.
Finally, DY represents a lagged growth variable. It is calculated
as the three-period moving average of the once, twice and thrice
lagged values of the dependent variable Y.
Equation (1) is estimated for 48 developing countries for which
the required data is available (the countries are listed in
Appendix Table 1). Pooled time-series cross-country regressions
are run for the 1982-1987 period by applying ordinary-least-
square techniques. The focus is on the recent past since the role
of exchange-rate policies has probably become more important
since the international debt crisis erupted in 1982, especially
for those countries to which foreign finance is no longer avail-
able. Regressions are run for various sub-groups of the overall
sample. This is because we expect the growth impact of devalu-
ations to differ between developing countries which reveal dif-
ferent structural characteristics in terms of income level, pre-
dominant exports, openness to world markets, exchange-rate vola-
tility, inflation, and foreign debt status (for the classifica-
tion of sample countries, see Appendix Table 1).
Current import and export values are deflated by the respective
unit value indices.16
In addition to equation (1) which uses current values of all
explaining variables, pooled time-series cross-country calcula-
tions are performed where once lagged or, twice lagged values of
the explaining variables enter the regression. Furthermore, a
first test of the hypothesis of contractionary devaluation is
performed on a cross-country basis by estimating equations (3)
and (4):
2
(3) Y = a + bR + cEGDP + dUOG + eTOT + fGLAG
(4) Y = a + bR + cEGDP + dUOG + eTOT + fGLAG + gRVAR
All variables are defined as in equation (1) except that they
represent period averages of 1982-1987. The signs of the co-
efficients b, c, d, and e expected in equation (1) should thus
also hold in equations (3) and (4). The lagged growth variable DY
in equation {1) is replaced by GLAG in equations (3) and (4);
GLAG denotes the average per-capita growth rate in 1978-1981,
i.e., the three years preceding the period considered in our
calculations. Equation (4) additionally considers the fluctuation
in real effective exchange rates as explaining variable; RVAR
denotes the standard deviation of the residuals calculated from
trend estimates of the real effective exchange rate in 1978-1987.
A negative sign is to be expected for RVAR if higher uncertainty
about exchange-rate developments involves costs in terms of lower
economic growth.
Current and lagged values of the explaining variables do not
enter the regressions simultaneously because this gives rise to
multicollinearity problems,
o
In a modified version of equations (3) and (4), EGDP is re-
placed by DGDP, i.e., the fiscal balance relative to GDP.
Equations (3) and (4) are run for a reduced set of 42 coun-
tries. Argentina, Ghana, Indonesia-, Kuwait, Nicaragua and
Nigeria are excluded from the overall sample. This is because
in these cases the calculation of period averages for 1982-1987
is heavily distorted by exceptional values of the explaining
variables in one specific period. This applies especially to
the real exchange-rate variable.17
2. Empirical Results
The results of the first cross-country test of the hypothesis of
contractionary devaluation are presented in Table 1. They strong-
ly underline the above mentioned pitfalls of a simplistic "be-
fore-and-after" approach in analysing the growth effects of ex-
change-rate changes. The summary statistics reveal that (1) the
42 developing countries considered experienced an average annual
devaluation of the real effective exchange rate of 4 per cent in
1982-1987, and (2) suffered from a decline in annual per-capita
GDP growth at the same time. Nevertheless the exchange-rate vari-
able (R) remains completely insignificant in all four equations
of Table 1. This is consistent with the results of Khan [1988]
who does not find evidence for contractionary effects of devalu-
ations undertaken in the context of IMF adjustment programs. In
sharp contrast to R, the degree of exchange-rate fluctuations
observed in 1978-1987 (RVAR) exhibits a significantly negative
impact on economic growth. This supports the view that uncertain-
ty about exchange-rate policies involves considerable costs in
terms of forgone growth.
However, the hypothesis of contractionary devaluation cannot be
rejected simply on these grounds. In the cross-country regres-
sions for 1982-1987, neither the monetary (UOG) and fiscal policy
variables (EGDP, DGDP) nor the external-shock variable (TOT) have
a significant impact on economic growth, as is the case for R.
This is probably because of several shortcomings of the regres-
sions presented in Table 1. First, it should be noted that the
results reflect the longer-term effects on economic growth be-
cause of the calculation of period averages over six years for
all variables. Actually it cannot be expected, for example, that
monetary surprise shocks have a significant impact on growth in
the medium and longer run. The same applies to fiscal policies
and terms-of-trade shocks. Annual changes in the explaining vari-
ables average out to a considerable degree. So, the short-term
growth effects may be severely blurred.
Second, different lags for the various explaining variables are
not allowed for. Third, a disaggregated analysis for different18




































































































































































(a) For the definition of variables, data sources, and calculation
procedures, see the text; t-values in parentheses; ** denotes
significance at the 5 per cent level of confidence; * 10 per cent
level (two-tailed t-test).
Source: Own calculations.19
country groups is rendered impossible by the limited number of
observations. The hypothesis that the growth impact of devalu-
ation depends on structural characteristics of the sample coun-
tries can only be tested by applying a pooled time-series cross-
country framework.
The pooled regression results are presented in Tables 2-7 (for
the summary statistics, see Appendix Table 2). For the overall
sample of 48 developing countries and for all country groups
considered, three separate regressions are run with contempora-
neous, once lagged, and twice lagged values of the explaining
variables respectively. Due to space considerations, the lagged
equations are given in the subsequent tables only if at least one
of the policy variables (R, EGDP, UOG) is significant at the 10
per cent level or better. The results for all 48 sample countries
clearly point to the limitations of the reduced form equation
2
that underlies the estimates (Table 2). Even by cross-country
standards, the overall explanatory power is fairly low. This may
be partly attributed to the fairly heterogeneous set of countries
included. Moreover, we do not aim at a complete specification of
the growth equation because the focus is on short-term adjustment
policies. An extended specification would have required, for
example, to include the investment ratio and world-market per-
The correlation coefficients for the explaining variables pre-
sented in Appendix Table 2 show that multicollinearity problems
do not exist.
2
Additional regressions were run for the 39 non-oil developing
countries of our sample. The results hardly differ from those
presented in Table 2, except that the negative growth impact of
terms-of-trade shocks is somewhat stronger and significant at
the 5 per cent level or better.
This contrasts sharply with the extremely high R
2s achieved by
Edwards which are consistently close to unity [1985a; 1989a].
Probably, the latter result is simply due to the inclusion of
country-specific trend variables. These are highly significant
because the period underlying the estimates is fairly long
(1965-1980 and 1965-1984 respectively). Khan [1988] does not
reveal any information on the explanatory power of his
estimates.20
formance as important determinants of economic growth in the
longer run.
Not surprisingly, the lagged growth variable (DY) is positively
correlated with current economic growth. The negative sign of the
Table 2 - Pooled Time-Series Cross-Country Regression Results for


































































(a) For the definition of variables, data sources, and calcula-
tion procedures, see the text; t-values in parentheses; ***
denotes significance at the 1 per cent level of confidence; ** 5
per cent level; * 10 per cent level (two-tailed t-test).
Source: Own calculations.
external-shock variable (TOT) was also to be expected, though it
is significant only in the once lagged variant. Fiscal policies,
as reflected in changes of the share of government expenditure in
GDP (EGDP), remain completely insignificant; while unanticipated
money creation (UOG) shows a small expansionary effect on econo-
mic growth in the current period. Most notably, the hypothesis of
contractionary devaluation is unambiguously rejected. The sig-
nificantly negative coefficients of R point to expansionary,
though not very strong, effects of devaluations in the period
when they were undertaken and in the two subsequent periods.21
The latter result supports our supposition that the contractio-
nary effects of contemporaneous devaluation found by Edwards
[1985a; 1989a] cannot be generalized. Edwards' sample is heavily
biased towards fairly advanced developing countries with a diver-
sified and manufactured export base, while low income exporters
of raw materials are hardly taken into account. Hence, we dif-
ferentiate the overall sample of 48 countries with regard to pre-
dominant exports and the level of economic development in the
next step. In this way, we provide a more rigorous test of the
hypothesis that contractionary effects of devaluation, if any,
are restricted to specific country groups.
The classification of different income groups is based on World
Bank data on per-capita income (for details, see Appendix Table
1). The regression" results support our proposition that the de-
gree and lag structure of exchange-rate effects on economic
growth differs between various country groups (Table 3). The mean
of annual devaluations in the 1982-1987 period was highest for
low income countries, with the standard deviation of R being
exceptionally high (Appendix Table 2). This may explain that the
negative coefficient of R is relatively small. But in contrast to
countries with higher income, the expansionary effects of devalu-
ation materialized in the same period when devaluations were
undertaken. Also for the more advanced developing countries,
there is no evidence pointing to contractionary devaluation; the
positive coefficients of the contemporaneous exchange-rate vari-
able are insignificant. But the expansionary effects were some-
what delayed, especially in the lower-middle income group.
In all three income groups, current growth was strongly in-
fluenced by the growth performance in the preceding periods. The
effects of external shocks and monetary and fiscal policies were
negligible, except for the lower-middle income group. It is in-
teresting to note that the latter countries experienced the
For low income countries, the coefficient of R remains com-
pletely insignificant in the lagged equations. The same applies
to the other policy variables.22
Table 3 - Regression Results for Developing Countries of Different






























































































































































(a) Classification based on World Bank data on per-capita income;
for details, see Appendix Table 1. For the definition of variables,
data sources, and calculation procedures, see the text; t-values in
parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level of
confidence; ** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level (two-tailed
t-test).
Source: Own calculations.23
steepest reduction in economic growth in 1982-1987 (Appendix
Table 2). At the same time, the average degree of devaluation was
relatively small, and the share of government expenditure in GDP
exceptionally high. So, this country group faced relatively
strong fiscal adjustment needs. Not surprisingly, fiscal adjust-
ment had short-term costs - in terms of lower economic growth.
According to the results of Table 3 it would be grossly mis-
leading to blame exchange-rate policies for this temporary de-
cline in growth (to which also adverse terms-of-trade shocks
contributed significantly).
The differences between specific country groups become even more
pronounced if the sample economies are classified according to
their predominant exports. Table 4 reveals that not only the
degree and lag structure of exchange-rate effects on economic
growth differed in the 1980s, but also their direction. The most
remarkable differences are to be observed if exporters of manu-
factures and agricultural exporters are compared. Most notably,
the results presented by Edwards in his earlier paper [1985a] are
confirmed for the group of exporters of manufactures in Table 4.
This was to be expected since Edwards' sample consists mainly of
developing countries for which manufactured exports figured prom-
inently. The contractionary effects of devaluation indicated by
Separate estimates were also performed for mineral exporters,
and exporters of services and recipients of private transfers.
These results are not presented here in detail. Because of the
extremely small number of mineral exporters in our sample the
degrees of freedom are reduced to about ten in the respective
equations. Nevertheless the following results may be note-
worthy: (1) For this group there is evidence that devaluations
were undertaken when growth was below the trend. The coefficient
of the lagged growth variable is significantly negative in the
growth equation with contemporaneous values of the other ex-
plaining variables, while the coefficient of R is insignifi-
cant. A simplistic "before-and-after" approach may thus lead to
the wrong conclusion of contractionary devaluation. (2) The
expansionary effects of devaluation were particularly strong
for mineral exporters, though they materialized with a con-
siderable lag of two periods. Extremely poor results were
achieved for the heterogeneous group of exporters of services
and recipients of private transfers (Barbados, Egypt, Jamaica,
Pakistan, Panama, Tanzania, and Upper Volta). With one excep-
tion (DY), all variables remain insignificant.24
Table 4 - Regression Results for Groups of Developing Coun-
































-0.24* 0.11** 0.72*** 0.48 6.96
(-1.98) (2.68) (3.67) (0.42) (37)
0.08 0.10** 0.89*** 0.44 6.56
(0.70) (2.66) (4.60) (0.37) (42)
0.03 0.01 0.63*** 0.19 2.13
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(a) Classified according to IMF information on predominant
exports; for details, see Appendix Table 1. For the defini-
tion of variables, data sources, and calculation procedures,
see the text; t-values in parentheses; *** denotes signifi-
cance at the 1 per cent level of confidence; ** 5 per cent
level; * 10 per cent level (two-tailed t-test).
Source: Own calculations.25
the contemporaneous exchange-rate variable are matched by simi-
larly strong expansionary effects in the subsequent period. Argu-
ably the degree of capacity utilization is relatively high in
countries with a favourable performance in exporting manufactured
goods. Contractionary effects of rising import prices are more
likely than in countries with a lower capacity utilization in the
production of tradables. Furthermore, international price link-
ages may be relatively strong for manufactures. Consequently,
devaluation results in price effects in the first place, while
positive supply effects are delayed. Finally, exchange-rate vola-
tility is extremely low for this country group. As argued below,
low exchange-rate fluctuations add to the stability in economic
growth. Therefore, real devaluation is neutral in the medium run.
Also similar to Edwards, money surprises had a significant impact
on economic growth in countries whose exports were concentrated
on manufactures. On the other hand, fiscal policies which Edwards
found to be significant remain completely insignificant in Table
id«
2
4. Adverse terms-of-trade shocks affected economic growth nega-
tively in the short run.
Apart from the negative growth effects of adverse terms-of-trade
shocks, the regressions run for agricultural exporters show a
considerably different pattern of coefficient values. Money
By contrast, both monetary and fiscal policies show the expec-
ted positive - and highly significant - coefficient values for
countries with a diversified export base. Exchange-rate poli-
cies were of minor importance,for this group. According to
Appendix Table 2, the average degree of devaluation in 1982-
1987 was considerably smaller than in the other country groups.
2
The terms-of-trade variable remains insignificant in Edwards'
analysis. As argued above, the growth impact of external shocks
cannot be assessed adequately simply by accounting for changes
in the terms of trade. So, the balance-of-payments effects of
terms-of-trade changes are considered here.
The results presented in Table 4 are based on data for 11 out
of the 14 agricultural exporters included in our sample. Argen-
tina, Ghana and Nicaragua are excluded in order to reduce the
extremely high volatility in real exchange rates observed for
the group of 14 countries. However, the major results remain
largely unaffected by this modification. Not surprisingly, the
absolute size of the coefficient of R declines for the extended
sample (-0.027), as the contractionary effects of high ex-
change-rate volatility are captured by R. But the negative
coefficient of R is still highly significant.26
surprises were negligible on average, as indicated by the ex-
tremely low mean of UOG in Appendix Table 2. By contrast, fiscal
policies had a strong impact on economic growth. Contractionary
effects of devaluation are not to be observed; devaluation was
rather growth-enhancing in the short run. This indicates that the
widespread export pessimism of agricultural exporters is not
justified. Adjustment costs in terms of lower growth are mainly
to be attributed to temporary recessionary effects of restrictive
fiscal policies.
Devaluation cannot be blamed for the poor growth performance of
developing countries with foreign debt problems either. In none
of the equations reported in Table 5, the exchange-rate variable
turns out to be positive. Actually, expansionary effects of de-
valuation were stronger in developing countries that encountered
debt problems in the 1980s than in countries without reschedul-
ings. But especially for the 14 heavily indebted countries these
effects materialized with considerable delay only. From the nega-
tive coefficient of the lagged growth variable (DY) it may be
concluded that devaluations were undertaken in this group when
economic growth was below the trend. With only one exception,
short-term fiscal and monetary policies had no significant impact
on economic growth in the two problem debtor groups. This indi-
cates that temporary adjustment measures are of little help to
restore economic growth in these countries, unless such measures
are an integrated part of comprehensive and consistent structural
reform packages.
A major aim of such structural reform packages must be to reduce
uncertainty of producers and investors, and thereby strengthen
the supply responsiveness towards changes in relative prices.
Uncertainty is for example created by high exchange-rate vola-
tility and high inflation. The relevance of structural differen-
ces in these respects in determining the growth impact of de-
On the role of exchange-rate policies for the recovery of the
agricultural sector in developing countries, see e.g. Bond
[1983]; Gulhati et al. [1986]; Chhibber [1988].27
Table 5 - Regression Results for Developing Countries with and
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(a) Classification according to World Bank information on re-
schedulings; for details, see Appendix Table 1. For the defini-
tion of variables, data sources, and calculation procedures,
see the text; t-values in parentheses; *** denotes significance
at the 1 per cent level of confidence; ** 5 per cent level; *
10 per cent level (two-tailed t-test).
Source: Own calculations.28
valuation is shortly discussed in the following. Table 6
supports the proposition that high exchange-rate fluctuations
reduce the growth-enhancing effects of devaluation considerably.
Notwithstanding extremely volatile real exchange rates, a weak
expansionary effect of devaluations is to be observed in the
period when they were undertaken. However, the coefficients of R
remain completely insignificant in the once and twice lagged
growth equations for the 15 countries with high exchange-rate
2
fluctuations. By contrast, the countries with less volatile
exchange-rate policies benefited from a by far more pronounced
rise in economic growth in the two periods following a devalu-
ation. A similar picture emerges when the sample countries are
classified according to the average degree of inflation in 1982-
1987. The coefficient of R is insignificant in five out of six
equations run for countries with annual inflation rates of 8 - 30
4
per cent and more than 30 per cent respectively. On the other
hand, a fairly strong expansionary impact of devaluation is
estimated for countries with inflation rates of less than 8 per
cent; the coefficient of R amounts to -0.133 (significant at the
5 per cent level) in the once lagged growth equation.
The revision of external trade policies would be another impor-
tant element of structural reform packages in problem-ridden
Due to space limitations, only some of the empirical estimates
performed are presented here. Detailed results are available
from the authors upon request.
2
Also for the 13 countries with very low exchange-rate fluctu-
ations no significant effects of R on economic growth are re-
vealed by the regressions (the results are not presented here).
This does not of course imply that exchange-rate policies were
irrelevant for the favourable growth performance of these coun-
tries [see also Khan, 1988, p. 19]. On the contrary, because of
stability-oriented exchange-rate policies they could do without
large real devaluations. Actually, not only the volatility of
exchange rates, but also the average degree of real devaluation
was considerably smaller than in other sample countries (Ap-
pendix Table 2).
The detailed results are not presented here.
4
The exception is the significantly negative coefficient of R
for the 12 countries with high inflation in the twice lagged
growth equation. But the coefficient value remains fairly small
in absolute terms (-0.024).29
Table 6 - Regression Results for Developing Countries with Medium


















































































































(a) Classified according to the standard deviation of the residuals
of the real effective exchange rate, based on trend estimates for
1978-1987; for details, see Appendix Table 1. For the definition of
variables, data sources, and calculation procedures, see the text;
t-values in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the 1 per cent
level of confidence; ** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level (two-
tailed t-test).
Source: Own calculations.30
developing countries. Openness towards world markets improves
the chances that changes in relative prices are transmitted into
supply responses. Consequently, the growth effects of devaluation
are expected to depend on the overall development approach of the
countries in question. Table 7 shows that this was indeed the
2
case to some extent. Though somewhat delayed, relatively strong
effects of devaluation on economic growth are estimated for
moderately open developing countries. The growth impact of ex-
change-rate policies was small and limited to the current period
in closed economies. However, negative growth effects - as hypo-
thesized by the extensive literature on contractionary devalu-
ation - did not materialize in either of the country groups con-
sidered.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Various channels have been identified in the literature through
which devaluations may cause contractionary effects on economic
growth in developing countries. The bewildering array of theore-
tical frameworks on contractionary devaluation has increasingly
challenged the view that the devaluation-induced substitution
It is no longer to be disputed that a world market-oriented
development approach is better suited to improve the growth
performance of Third World economies than persistent and com-
prehensive import substitution policies. For the substantial
body of research on this issue, see e.g. Krueger [1978];
Donges, Miiller-Ohlsen [1978]; Tyler [1981]; Balassa [1984].
2
However, the differences in the growth effects of devaluation
are not as pronounced as one might have expected. This may be
partly' due to the shortcomings of the indicator applied to
classify the sample countries into closed, moderately open and
open economies. The ratio of exports plus imports over GDP is
heavily influenced by the overall size of the economies. This
bias may also contribute to the extremely poor explanatory
power of most equations in Table 7. Moreover, the fact that the
coefficients of R remain insignificant for the group of 14 open
economies (not included in Table 7) may be explained in a simi-
lar way as in the case of countries with low exchange-rate
fluctuations. Appendix Table 2 shows that also in open econo-
mies both the average degree of devaluation and exchange-rate
volatility were far below the figures calculated for other
country groups.31
Table 7 - Regression Results for Developing Countries with Dif-
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(a) Classification according to the sum of exports and imports
over GDP; for details, see Appendix Table 1. For the definition
of variables, data sources, and calculation procedures, see the
text; t-values in parentheses; *** denotes significance at the
1 per cent level of confidence; ** 5 per cent level; * 10 per
cent level (two-tailed t-test).
Source: Own calculations.
effects on both the demand and supply side are sufficiently
strong to assure an expansionary net effect on aggregate pro-
duction and employment. The theoretical debate has added to the
widespread export pessimism of Third World economies and to their
reluctance to use exchange-rate policies as an expenditure
switching device in economic adjustment programs. This pessimism
has also been feeded by empirical studies that found devaluations
to be associated with lower growth and pointed to the failure of
IMF adjustment programs in restoring economic growth.
In this paper, however, it is argued that the pessimism about the
growth effects of real devaluation is not justified. Many argu-32
ments in the ongoing theoretical debate on contractionary devalu-
ation are based on questionable assumptions. In some models,
growth-enhancing substitution effects of a devaluation are simply
assumed away. The empirical evidence is still extremely sketchy.
Especially the "before-and-after" approach applied in many
studies suffers from serious shortcomings. Typically, not the
growth impact of devaluation per se is assessed, but rather the
combined effects of external factors and of adjustment packages
which also include restrictive macroeconomic policies.
To overcome major conceptual weaknesses in previous empirical
research, we have subjected a reduced form equation on the growth
impact of devaluation to regression analysis. First, this
approach does not require arbitrary assumptions on crucially
important parameter values. Second, it is possible to control for
external factors and internal policy measures other than currency
realignments. Third, the pooled time-series cross-country anal-
ysis for 1982-1987 allows to differentiate between various coun-
try groups, and thereby to test the hypothesis that the growth
impact of real devaluation depends on structural characteristics
of the economies considered.
The empirical results can be summarized as follows. In a cross-
country context, we do not find evidence for contractionary
effects of devaluation for a set of 42 developing countries. But
the degree of exchange-rate volatility exhibits a significantly
negative impact on economic growth. This supports the view that
uncertainty about exchange-rate policies involves considerable
costs in terms of forgone growth. The hypothesis of contracti-
onary devaluation is also rejected in the pooled regressions run
for the overall sample.
The group-specific estimates support the proposition that the
direction, the degree and the lag structure of the growth effects
of devaluation depend on structural characteristics of the eco-
nomies :33
- Contractionary effects of devaluation are only observed for
exporters of manufactures in the period when devaluations took
place. This negative growth impact was matched by similarly
strong expansionary effects in the subsequent period.
- Devaluation was growth-enhancing in the short run for agri-
cultural exporters. This indicates that the widespread pessi-
mism about agricultural supply responsiveness to changes in
relative prices is not justified.
- Devaluation cannot be blamed for the poor growth performance of
developing countries with foreign debt problems either. But
especially for heavily indebted countries the expansionary
effects of devaluation materialized with considerable delay
only.
Generally, the decline in economic growth experienced by many
developing countries in the 1980s cannot be attributed to real
devaluation. It was rather due to restrictive monetary and fiscal
policies, and to adverse world market developments in some in-
stances. Especially fiscal adjustment had short-term costs in
terms of lower economic growth in several country groups, as was
to be expected. Developing countries would thus be ill-advised to
stick to overvalued domestic currencies. The adjustment costs are
likely to increase unless the required revision of fiscal and
monetary policies is complemented by real devaluation.
However, the estimates indicate as well that short-term adjust-
ment measures are not sufficient to restore economic growth in
today's problem-ridden developing countries. The expansionary
effects of real devaluation remain weak for countries with high
inflation and extremely volatile exchange-rate policies. Hence,
structural reform packages should aim at reducing uncertainty of
producers and investors about the course of monetary and ex-
change-rate policies. This would help to strengthen the supply
responsiveness to changes in relative prices. Similarly, openness
towards world markets improves the prospects that devaluation-
induced changes in relative prices are transmitted into supply34
responses. A critical review of external trade policies should
thus be a major element of structural reform programs. Especially
for many developing countries with severe foreign debt problems
it is crucially important to overcome persistent and comprehen-
sive import substitution policies, and thereby improve the
chances for expansionary devaluation.35

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1 continued
n.a. = not available
(a) Based on average annual growth of GDP per capita in constant
prices in 1982-1987 [UNCTAD, 1988]; "pos" for 14 countries with
per-capita income growth (w) of more than 1.5 per cent; "stag"
for 16 countries with 1.5 > w > -1.0; "decl" for 18 countries
with w < -1.0.
(b) 13 low income countries ("low"), 22 countries with lower-
middle income ("lmid"), 9 countries with upper-middle income
("umid"), and 1 high income country ("high") classified accord-
ing to World Bank [1989, Appendix Table 1]; no comparable data
available for Barbados, Gambia, and Taiwan.
(c) Countries classified by predominant exports as in IMF [1989,
pp. 118ff.]: 9 oil exporters ("oil"); 9 exporters of manufac-
tures ("man"); 14 agricultural exporters ("agr"); 3 mineral
exporters ("min"); 6 countries with diversified export base
("div"); 7 exporters of services and recipients of private
transfers ("serv").
(d) Calculated as sum of exports and imports over GDP [data from
IMF, b]; "clo" for 15 closed economies with an average share of
less than 30 per cent in 1982-1987; "mod" for 19 economies with
a share of between 30 and 50 per cent; "open" for 14 economies
with a share of more than 50 per cent.
(e) Standard deviation of the residuals calculated from trend
estimates of the real effective exchange rate for 1978-1987;
"low" for 13 countries with a standard deviation of less than 8;
"med" for 20 countries with a standard deviation of between 8
and 20; "high" for 15 countries with a standard deviation of
more than 20.
(f) The 29 countries for which the World Bank [1988] reports
reschedulings with official or private creditors are regarded as
borrowers with debt problems ("prob"); "non" for 19 countries
without reschedulings; "hie" denotes 14 heavily indebted coun-
tries as defined in the same source.
(g) Average annual change of consumer prices in 1982-1987 [IMF,
b]; "low" for 16 countries with price increases of less than 8
per cent; "med" for 20 countries with price increases of between
8 and 30 per cent; "high" for 12 countries with price increases
of more than 30 per cent.
Source: IMF [b]; IMF [1989]; UNCTAD [1988]; World Bank [1988;
1989] .37





























































































































































































































Appendix Table 2 continued
29 coun- 14 heavi- 19 coun- 15 coun- 20 coun- 13 coun- 15 19 14 open
tries with ly in- tries tries tries with tries closed moder- economies
debt debted without with high medium with low economies ately
problems countries debt exchange exchange exchange open
problems jrate flue- rate flue- rate flue- econo-




































































































































































































































(a) For the definition of variables and data sources, see the text.
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